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Abstract
In many economies, wealth is strikingly concentrated. Entrepreneurs–individuals with ownership in for-profit enterprises–
comprise a large portion of the wealthiest individuals, and their behavior may help explain patterns in the national
distribution of wealth. Entrepreneurs are less diversified and more heavily invested in their own companies than is
commonly assumed in economic models. We present an intentionally simplified individual-based model of wealth
generation among entrepreneurs to assess the role of chance and determinism in the distribution of wealth. We
demonstrate that chance alone, combined with the deterministic effects of compounding returns, can lead to unlimited
concentration of wealth, such that the percentage of all wealth owned by a few entrepreneurs eventually approaches 100%.
Specifically, concentration of wealth results when the rate of return on investment varies by entrepreneur and by time. This
result is robust to inclusion of realities such as differing skill among entrepreneurs. The most likely overall growth rate of the
economy decreases as businesses become less diverse, suggesting that high concentrations of wealth may adversely affect
a country’s economic growth. We show that a tax on large inherited fortunes, applied to a small portion of the most
fortunate in the population, can efficiently arrest the concentration of wealth at intermediate levels.
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Introduction
The distribution of wealth is a fundamental property of how
society is structured and has myriad economic, political, and social
implications. The right to keep a large part of what one earns is
one of the basic ten ts of democratic capitalism, which provides
incentives to invest and contribute to the productivity of the
economy. However, large concentrations of wealth raise equity
issues and may be incompatible with democracy itself; as put
bluntly by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis: ‘‘We can
either have democracy in this country or we can have great wealth
concentrated in the hands of a few, but we cannot have both.’’
Models of the wealth distribution [1–5] have failed to capture
the empirically observed large concentration of wealth in the top
few percentiles, predicting too even a wealth distribution [6]. A
range of explanations have been offered for this discrepancy. Some
observers attribute the concentration of wealth to political factors
[7] or to inherent properties of human nature such as differences
in human capital (reviewed in [8]). In addition, even though
empirical patterns show that savings rates increase with household
earnings [9–11], many models of savings assume that individuals
save to buffer against earnings shocks so that savings rates decline
when an individual accumulates sufficient wealth [6,12,13].
Recent work has identified the importance of entrepreneurship
in generating high concentrations of wealth [11,14,15]. Entrepre-
neurs differ in their investment strategies from those assumed by
most economic models. Rather than being diversified (as assumed
by Capital Asset Pricing Models, e.g. [16]), successful entrepre-
neurs often retain a majority of their wealth in ownership of
businesses they lead (e.g. [17,18]). There may be a variety of
cultural reasons for this. For example, entrepreneurs may by
nature be more confident in their ability to produce wealth
through their own businesses than through the stock market, or
may feel the need to retain ownership to signal confidence in their
business or to retain decision making power, prestige, or other
non-pecuniary benefits [17,18]. Entrepreneurship is quite fre-
quent–about 1 in 9 people in the United States is self-employed,
and this rate of entrepreneurship has held steady over at least the
past two decades [19].
Analysis
We analyze whether a simple individual-based stochastic model
that includes compounding returns can generate the highly
concentrated wealth distribution observed among entrepreneurs
in real populations. Before considering more complicated
explanations, we believe it is useful to understand whether wealth
concentration could occur due to the effects of chance alone. The
effects of chance on wealth distribution may be revealed in models
that track the wealth of individual entrepreneurs and include
stochasticity, as opposed to more commonly used aggregate
general equilibrium models, which do not allow for effects of
stochastic variation among individuals. We isolate the role of
chance by starting with assumptions that favor equality of wealth
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e            and exclude other factors that could lead to the concentration of
wealth. We assume that all individuals have equal talent and begin
with the same amount of capital. We also assume that business
success in one year is not correlated with future business success.
After exploring the implications of these assumptions, we test
whether our conclusions are robust to variations in assumptions.
Among entrepreneurs, the dynamics of wealth concentration are
determined largely by growth (or loss) of business worth. Therefore,
we track capital wealth and assume that labor income does not
factor into the growth of capital wealth. In economic terms, another
waytoarriveat this assumptionis if allexisting capitalis invested,all
capital income is reinvested, and consumption is equal to labor
income. This allows us to track capital without the need to track
labor income or consumption.
We assume all entrepreneurs begin with equal capital, set to 1
unit of wealth. In each time period (k~1,2,...,t) each entrepre-
neur (i~1,2,...,n) invests their capital and earns a return rate, ri,k,
that is randomly drawn from a normaldistribution withmean m and
variance s2. In reality, variance in return rate could be due to many
factors, however the goal of our model is to assess the influence of
chance alone. We investigate this by assuming all entrepreneurs are
equal in all factors that could affect return rate, except for the effects
of chance. Because returns are independent random draws for each
individual for each period, in our simplest model we avoid (1)
temporal autocorrelation, i.e., a successful entrepreneur in one
period does not have an increased chance of getting a high rate of
return insubsequent periods, (2)correlation acrossindividualsinthe
same time period, i.e., all years have a constant average rate of
return, and (3) differences among individuals in the chance of
getting high or low returns. The number of individuals in this
simplest model does not change, nor is there any explicit treatment
of death. Thus, this version of the model describes the wealth of
individual entrepreneurial families in a society where accumulated
wealth is passed seamlessly to the next generation.
Results
This simple model demonstrates that, with passing time, the
proportion of wealth held by an arbitrarily small fraction of
entrepreneurs asymptotically approaches 1–that is, a small
proportion of entrepreneurs come to possess essentially all of the
wealth. Given a rate of return ri,k, the factor by which
entrepreneur i’s capital increases in time period k is eri,k. The
total amount of capital accumulated by entrepreneur i as of period
t is eri,1:eri,2    eri,t~eri,1zri,2z   zri,t~exi, where xi~
Pt
k~1 ri,k.I f
the rates ri,k are drawn from a normal distribution with mean m
and variance s2, the exponential portion of this number (the sum
of the rates) will be normally distributed with mean mt and
variance s2t. Then the total wealth is the individual cumulative
wealth, exi, integrated over the probability density function of the
normal distribution and multiplied by the number of individuals.
The proportion of wealth held by an arbitrarily small percentage
of the entrepreneurs is thus represented as the ratio of two
integrals, with total wealth of the population in the denominator
and wealth of the top percentage in the numerator.
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The integral in the numerator can represent the wealth in any
segment of the population. Parameter h sets the lower limit of
integration at a specific number of standard deviations above the
mean. Because the integral extends to infinity, it captures the top
portion of the wealth distribution , where h determines which top
proportion is captured (e.g. 1%, 10%, etc.). When parameter
h&2:326, the integral starts at 99%, such that the numerator
quantifies the wealth within the top 1% of the population. The
notation ‘‘erf’’ refers to the ‘‘error function’’, the sigmoidal
function related to the cumulative normal probability distribution
and defined by erf x~(2=
ﬃﬃﬃ
p
p
)
Ð x
0 e{z2
dz. Since erf x approaches
1a sx approaches infinity, the right-hand side of Equation 1 also
approaches 1 as t approaches infinity, for any fixed value of h.I n
other words, the proportion of wealth held by an arbitrarily small
proportion of entrepreneurs approaches 1 through time, and
essentially all the wealth of the entrepreneurs ultimately will be
possessed by only a few individuals. Note that, from the right-hand
side of Equation 1, the rate at which wealth concentrates is
positively related to the variance in individual rates of return, s2,
but independent of the mean rate, m. Thus, perhaps surprisingly,
wealth will concentrate by this mechanism in growing, stagnant, or
shrinking economies.
In this simplest model, the concentration of wealth occurs
merely because some individuals are lucky by randomly receiving
a series of high growth rates, and once they are ahead with
exponentially growing capital, they tend to stay ahead. Because
the variance in the sum of return rates is additive, over time the
individuals with interest rates at the right tail of the ever-widening
normal distribution come to dominate the wealth. Recall that it is
the exponents that are normally distributed, not the amount of
wealth, so that individuals at the high end of the distribution
achieve exponentially greater fortunes. Because of the law of large
numbers, our results are robust to changes in the assumption that
returns on investment are drawn from a normal distribution.
Annual returns drawn from any distribution that obeys the central
limit theorem will give exponents whose sum approaches a normal
distribution. Note that wage income, because it does not grow
exponentially, is not expected to have similar wealth-concentrating
effects.
The analytical results can be illustrated by simulations of
individual-based models (Fig. 1). Although the results apply to any
arbitrarily small proportion of the entrepreneurs, for presentation
we track the accumulation of wealth in the top 1% of the
population. The rate at which the top 1% accumulates wealth is
dependent on the variance of the returns; when the variance is
high, wealth concentrates quickly. For example, when the variance
is 0.3, with a yearly time step it takes only 100 years for the top 1%
to increase their share of the wealth from 40% (the recent level in
the United States [7]) to 90% (e.g., from years 50 to 150 in
Fig. 1A). These results show that, based on chance alone, some
individuals will have a string of high returns and, given enough
time, will accumulate the overwhelming majority of the wealth.
We note that the analytical solution (1) assumes an infinite
population, which guarantees the presence of some extremely
lucky individuals, but our simulations show the same results in
populations of only 100,000. We found similar results for
simulations with populations of only 10,000 (not shown). Thus,
the influence of random variation in individual returns is still clear
in finite populations. The Gini coefficient also illustrates the rapid
concentration of wealth that occurs in our model due to chance
alone (Fig. 1B).
The concentration of wealth has consequences for the most
likely growth rate of the sum of all the entrepreneurs’ capital,
hereafter referred to, for brevity, as ‘‘the economy.’’ While the
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of all individuals’ wealth exit, and thus the wealth of the economy
as a whole, is e(mzs2=2)t. However, the mode of the distribution–the
most common individual wealth—is e(m{s2)t. This is illustrated in
Fig. 2, which shows that over time, in an economy that starts with
complete equality–such that the mode, median, and mean wealth
are all equal–the mean increases over time as e(mzs2=2)t, much
faster than the median, which increases only as emt, while the mode
may actually decrease as e(m{s2)t. These counter-intuitive effects
are direct consequences of the properties of the log-normal
distribution.
Thus, the wealth of the economy as a whole grows faster than
the wealth of most individuals who make up the economy. In large
populations with a diverse distribution of wealth, the most likely
growth rate of the economy will approach the mean of (mzs2=2)t,
because, at any given time increment, the sum of many individual
lines of capital will contribute. However, as the bulk of the wealth
concentrates with a few individuals in any finite population, the
Figure 1. Concentration of wealth over time. All simulations start with an even distribution of wealth. Unless otherwise noted, all simulations
were run with 100,000 individuals and a 5% yearly average return on investment. Red lines show the analytically expected trajectories (Eqn. 1); points
show the results from individual-based simulations. Three replicate simulations were run for each high variance simulation. (A) Higher variance
among individual rates of return increases the rate of wealth concentration. (B) Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient also increases over
time. (C) Wealth concentrates even when the mean growth rate varies over time, such that in some years the total economy grows and in others the
economy shrinks. Average annual rates of return were randomly drawn from a normal distribution with m~ln1:08&7:7% and s~0:19, with a new
value for the economy drawn each year. (D) Population growth and splitting estates among heirs does not significantly reduce rate of wealth
concentration. Dashed blue line shows the growing population. (E) A tax on inherited fortunes slows and arrests the concentration of wealth. (F)
Immigrants with mean wealth slow but do not arrest the concentration of wealth. Dashed blue line shows population increase from immigration.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020728.g001
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of those few individuals and the most likely growth of the economy
will decrease toward the individual modal return of (m{s2)t.
Thus, a diversity of independent lines of capital increases the most
likely growth rate of the economy.
If centrally planned economies are viewed as having only one
line of capital, then our results suggest that a centrally planned
economy will likely have lower economic growth than an economy
with diverse entrepreneurial activity. Ironically, the benefits
derived from diversity in capitalist economies can be destroyed
by a property inherent in the economy itself–the tendency of
compounding chance, left unchecked, to concentrate wealth and
effectively reduce the diversity that led to the high rates of
economic growth in the first place. However, real capitalist and
real centrally planned economies have many other differences that
are also likely to contribute to differences in growth.
Model robustness
The purpose of our model is to illustrate how concentration of
wealth arises naturally under the simplest conditions, not to
realistically describe all the features of a free market economy.
However, it is important to consider whether the tendency towards
concentration of wealth observed in our model is likely to be
swamped by modifications that incorporate additional features of
real economies. We find that our conclusions are robust to several
such modifications.
(1) Real economies have periods of growth and recession, such
that in some years the average rate of return is high and in other
years it is low or negative. We simulated conditions in which the
rate of return for the market varied normally across years with a
mean annual increase of 8 percent per annum and a standard
deviation of 19. These parameters reflect the distribution of real
inflation-corrected returns for the S&P 500 between 1871 and
2009. Allowing for this economy-wide temporal variation in
growth did not affect the concentration of wealth in our model
simulations (Fig. 1C). This is consistent with our analytical
prediction that wealth concentrates in growing, shrinking, and
stagnant economies.
(2) Consider a model with population increase where entrepre-
neurs may divide an inheritance among multiple offspring.
Assume that an individual dies and that his or her estate is split
evenly between two offspring on average every 80 years.
Individual-based simulations of these conditions show that such
division of inherited wealth does not significantly affect the rate of
wealth concentration (Fig. 1D).
(3) Immigration can bring new entrepreneurs to a society.
Simulations show that immigrant entrepreneurs with little
individual wealth speed concentration of wealth (not shown),
whereas immigrant entrepreneurs with mean wealth (which is
much higher than median wealth) slightly slow the rate of wealth
concentration (Fig. 1F).
(4) Individuals who are relatively successful entrepreneurs today
are more likely to be successful in the future, such that there is
temporal autocorrelation in returns. Temporal autocorrelation
acts to speed up the concentration of wealth, because individuals
with initially high rates of return are likely to continue to receive
high rates of return (not shown).
Thus, many of the modifications we have discussed to make the
model more realistic produce an even faster rate of wealth
concentration than that seen in the simplest, purely random
models.
Empirical patterns of wealth distribution
Because entrepreneurs drive patterns of wealth concentration
among the richest citizens, and because one of nine Americans is
self-employed, patterns of wealth concentration observed across
the whole population could be predicted by our simple model. Our
model predicts a log-normal distribution of wealth. In contrast, the
Figure 2. Modeled wealth distribution. In simulations with s~0:3, m~5% and all 100,000 individuals starting with wealth of 1 at time zero, the
lower portion of the wealth distribution is represented by the blue line at time t~6, the red line at time t~12, and the black line at time t~31. Circles
indicate the median wealth and diamonds indicate the mean wealth. Note that mean wealth increases much faster than median wealth, while in this
case the modal wealth, identified by the peaks of the curves, decreases. Over time, an increasing portion of the population has wealth greater than 20
units (0.01% of the population, 1%, and 18% at t~6, 12, and 31, respectively), which is not depicted because it falls beyond the right boundary of the
graph.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020728.g002
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distributed according to what has become known as Pareto’s law
[20]. Much research on the distribution of wealth has been based
on explaining or debating the patterns first observed by Pareto [8].
Although many studies have shown or assumed strong agreement
between empirical data and Pareto’s law [1,4,8,21], we are not
aware of any studies comparing the goodness of fit of a Pareto
distribution and a log-normal distribution to modern data on the
distribution of wealth. Our simple model provides a better fit than
Pareto’s law to data for the distribution of wealth in the United
States in 1995 (i.e., as noted by May [22], these data are log-
normally distributed; Fig. 3). Although much research on the
distribution of wealth attempts to explain the mechanisms behind
the Pareto distribution [8], our results suggest that a broader
consideration of wealth distribution patterns and the mechanisms
behind them is necessary. Our results are also consistent with the
observations of Taleb, who argues that chance plays a large role in
determining success among professional stock traders [23].
Tax policy
Historically, wealth concentrations have varied widely. For
example, in the United States, the top 1% of the population has
owned between 15 and 40% of the wealth during the 20th
Century [7]. The progressive income tax and the estate tax are two
policies that have been used to moderate the concentration of
wealth [24–28]. For example, the federal income tax rate for the
highest income bracket was over 90% in the United States from
1951–1963 [29], effectively curtailing the concentration of wealth
[24], but also creating undesirable negative incentives from high
tax rates [30,31]. Here we investigate whether a tax on inherited
fortunes affecting only a small percentage of the most elite
accumulated estates can effectively moderate the concentration of
wealth [26].
We model an inherited fortune tax with the following
assumptions: (1) life expectancy is 80 years, (2) a tax is applied
only to the inherited fortunes of the wealthiest fraction of the
entrepreneurs, with wealth above a designated cutoff [Fig. 1C], (3)
the tax is applied by allocating a percentage of the amount of
wealth greater than the cutoff and using it to benefit the whole
population–for example by uniformly reducing other taxes, or by
donations to causes that broadly benefit society.
The results show that an inherited fortune tax effectively halts
the concentration of wealth in our models (Fig. 1E). In this
example the concentration of wealth is halted by applying the tax
to only a very small percentage of the population, i.e. the top
0.1%. However, the level at which the concentration of wealth is
halted depends on the variance in the mean rate of return. When
the variance in the rate of return is high, wealth concentrates faster
and equilibrates at higher concentrations.
This analysis illustrates that limiting inter-generational transfer
of wealth through an inherited fortune tax or equivalent
mechanism can moderate the concentration of wealth, based on
our model of entrepreneurs in industrialized societies. Recent
empirical work in small-scale societies found that concentration of
wealth also occurs there and is positively correlated with the
degree of inter-generational wealth transmission [32], a pattern
consistent with our model predictions. Jointly, both studies suggest
that the degree of inter-generational wealth transmission is a factor
in the concentration of wealth in a range of economic systems.
Discussion
Empirical patterns of wealth distribution show greater concen-
tration of wealth than is predicted by current economic models,
and this wealth is disproportionately concentrated in the hands of
wealthy entrepreneurs. Our analysis demonstrates that an
inexorable effect of chance can lead to unlimited concentrations
of wealth in the hands of a few. This occurs whenever different
entrepreneurs invest in different businesses, experience different
rates of return on their investments, and reinvest their capital
income. Thus, inevitable random fluctuations may help explain
the high concentrations of wealth that are commonly observed
Figure 3. Actual distribution of U.S. wealth in 1995. Solid line represents the best fit for the Pareto distribution (r2~0:87) and the dashed curve
represents the best fit from our model (r2~0:98). The x-axis shows accumulated capital, log scale; the y-axis shows the portion of the population
having that amount of capital or more, log scale. Both are two-parameter curves.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020728.g003
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predicted by our model is a better fit to recent observed wealth
distribution data than is the Pareto function.
Concentrations of wealth reduce the diversity of independent
capital lines that can meaningfully contribute to business growth,
thus reducing the most likely aggregated business growth.
Progressively deepening disparities between modal and mean
wealth, as in Fig. 2, also represent increasing inequalities that may
engender social instability. If society desires to promote overall
economic growth and curtail the unlimited concentration of
wealth, our work suggests that an inherited fortune tax–that is, an
estate tax perpetually restricted to only the very largest estates (e.g.
indexed to inflation)–can effectively limit the concentration of
wealth under the conditions we have described. Three additional
qualities of such an inherited fortune tax are worth noting: (1) the
inherited fortune tax need only apply to a small percentage of the
population in order to be effective [26]; (2) because it is imposed
after an individual’s death it maintains important economic
incentives for entrepreneurs, who are able to reap the full benefits
of their successful endeavors during their lifetime [26]; (3) because
the concentration of wealth may reduce the most likely rate of
economic growth, an inherited fortunes tax could help maintain
conditions necessary for growth across the economy as a whole.
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